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NOTE
CORPORATE DISCONNECT:
THE BLACKWATER PROBLEM AND
THE FCPA SOLUTION
Andre M. Pefialver*
In the aftermath of the Nisour Square tragedy, in which seventeen
Iraqi civilians died as a result of actions by Blackwater USA, a security
contractor, the United States was confronted with a loophole in its crimi-
nal law. While the responsible Blackwater guards would face stiff penal-
ties under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for any accounting fraud
committed abroad, there was no obvious criminal statute that would
cover the senseless act of violence in Nisour Square. With the growth of
military contractors specifically and the spread of globalization gener-
ally, violent acts by corporations proliferate.
This Note aims to show that a criminal statute with extraterritorial
jurisdiction is the proper solution to the Blackwater problem and the
plague of corporate human rights abuses abroad. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) already holds corporations criminally liable for
accounting and bribery crimes committed overseas. Congress need only
amend the FCPA to address a larger scope of crimes, including human
rights abuses, to hold corporations such as Blackwater responsible for
their actions. That our statutes make a crime of a corporation's over-
seas accounting fraud but not overseas murder is an absurdity that de-
mands change.
This Note will explore a variety of legal regimes in search of a
possible legal solution to the Blackwater problem. As all existing legal
regimes are inadequate, this Note then looks to the FCPA, which has
proven promisingly effective in addressing extraterritorial crimes. In or-
der to understand why U.S. law does not already criminalize human
rights abuses, the Note considers the historical relationship between cor-
porations and government, beginning with the underpinnings of that re-
lationship in Roman law and political theory. The Note will then
examine the problems that arose from British joint-stock trading compa-
* A.B., Harvard University, 2006; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2010. I would
like to thank the staff of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy for making this Note
coherent, Professor Eric Nelson for introducing me to great ideas, some of which I tried to
employ here, and my family for providing everything else.
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nies and Gilded Age business corporations. Applying the solutions that
the British and U.S. governments employed in the past, this Note will
explain how expanding the FCPA by adopting new human rights provi-
sions can address the Blackwater problem and many of the other human
rights abuses that arise from globalization.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2007, a bomb exploded a few hundred yards
from a Baghdad compound in which American diplomats were meeting. 1
Guards working for Blackwater USA, a private military corporation
under contract with the State Department, immediately assembled a con-
voy to transport the diplomats back to the Green Zone, the heavily forti-
fied zone in central Baghdad.2 Upon reaching Nisour Square, the guards
halted traffic and took defensive positions around the intersection. 3 After
securing the square, one of the Blackwater guards opened fire on a car,
I See James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, Blackwater Role in Shooting Said to Include
Chaos, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2007, at Al.
2 Id.
3 Id.
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killing its driver and a female passenger who was clutching her infant.4
Another guard allegedly fired a grenade into a girls' school nearby.5 The
ensuing chaos, resulting in seventeen civilian deaths and twenty civilians
wounded, ended only after one Blackwater guard drew his weapon on
another to force him to stop firing. 6 Although the guards claimed to have
acted in self-defense, an F.B.I. investigation found that fourteen of the
seventeen civilian deaths were unjustified; 7 both the dead and wounded
were unarmed. 8
While Nisour Square received more attention than most incidents
involving military contractors, the problem is not a new one.9 Since the
end of the Cold War, the military's use of private soldiers has quadru-
pled. 10 "By 2008, the 'estimated 180,000 private contractors outnum-
ber[ed] the 160,000 US. troops stationed in [Iraq]."'' l With so many
private contractors in such volatile locations, abuses such as the Nisour
Square incident abound. On July 8, 2006, a military contractor intention-
ally fired into a moving taxi for amusement, after allegedly telling col-
leagues "I want to kill somebody today."1 2 On December 24, 2006, a
Blackwater guard who had been drinking heavily shot and killed a body-
guard of the Iraqi Vice President. 13 In 2007, the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform found that Blackwater had been in-
4 Id.
5 See Del Quentin Wilber, Contractors Charged in '07 Iraq Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec.
9, 2008, at A2 (citing an indictment brought by federal prosecutors).
6 See Glanz & Tavernise, supra note 1, at A12 (quoting an American official stating that
one guard "got on another one about the situation and supposedly pointed a weapon").
7 See David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without
Cause, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2007, at Al (citing findings by FBI agents concluding that three
of the seventeen deaths "may have been justified" because they may have resulted from a
"perceived" threat-even if no threat actually existed).
8 See Jeremy Scahill, Justice, of a Sort, for Blackwater, THE NATION, Dec. 8, 2008,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081222/scahill?rel=hp-picks [hereinafter Sca-
hill, Justice, of a Sort]. As of the publication of this Note, a federal judge threw out the
indictment against the four Blackwater guards responsible for the Nisour Square incident. See
Charlie Savage, Charges Voided for Contractors in Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at
Al. The judge cited the government's "reckless violation of defendants' constitutional rights."
Id. In addition, the judge's scathing and detailed review of the tainted evidence in the case
makes either an appeal or a new prosecution unlikely.
9 See Robert Capps, Crime without Punishment, SALON, July 27, 2002, http://dir.salon.
com/story/news/feature/2002/06/27/military/index.html; see also Phillip Carter, Hired Guns,
SLATE, Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2098571.
10 Joshua S. Press, Crying Havoc Over the Outsourcing of Soldiers and Democracy's
Slipping Grip on the Dogs of War, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 109, 111 (2008).
1 Id. at 111 (quoting Tom Baldwin, Blackwater Denies Rogue Mercenary Charge,
TItEs (London), Oct. 3, 2007, at 31).
12 Steve Fainaru, Four Hired Guns in an Armored Truck, Bullets Flying, and a Pickup
and a Taxi Brought to a Halt. Who Did the Shooting and Why?, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, at
Al (reporting on abuses committed by a Triple Canopy employee).
13 John M. Broder, Ex-Paratrooper Is Suspect In Drunken Killing of Iraqi, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2007, at A1O.
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volved in 195 "escalation of force" incidents since 2005.14 More re-
cently, reporters discovered that the CIA hired and trained Blackwater
for an aborted plan to assassinate Al Qaeda leaders. 15 Above all, the
U.S. government contributed to the problem by freeing such contractors
from legal constraints: on June 28, 2004, as his last act before stepping
down as head of Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer is-
sued Order 17, immunizing contractors in Iraq from prosecution in Iraqi
courts. 16
These incidents in Iraq have taken their toll on both relations with
Iraqis and on the world's perception of the United States. Understanda-
bly, Iraqis have expressed outrage over the impunity with which Black-
water guards have killed innocent civilians. 17 Likewise, the question of
contractor immunity "has become a key issue in negotiations" between
U.S. and Iraqi diplomats. 18 The critical role private contractors played in
the abuses at Abu Ghraib has further fed anti-American propaganda
across the world. 19
Of course, the issue of corporate human rights abuses is not limited
to Iraq and Blackwater USA. In June 2009, Shell settled a federal suit in
which Nigerian families sued the company for its alleged complicity in
the execution of eight Nigerian activists, including Nobel Laureate Ken
Saro-Wiwa. 20 In 2007, Yahoo settled a lawsuit brought by two Chinese
journalists who claimed that Yahoo's disclosures to the Chinese govern-
14 See MAI. STAFF OF MEMBERS ON THE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov. REFORM,
1 IOTH CONG., MEMORANDUM ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT BLACKWATER USA (Oct.
1, 2007).
15 See Mark Mazzetti, Outsiders Hired As C.I.A. Planned To Kill Jihadists, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2009, at Al. Although this plan emerged in 2002, Congress did not learn about it
until 2009. See id.
16 See JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
MERCENARY ARMY 163 (Nation Books 2007); see also Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zeilbauer,
The Judgment Gap: In a Case Like the Blackwater Shootings, There Are Many Laws but More
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at Al.
17 See Steve Fainaru, Warnings Unheeded On Guards In Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2007, at Al (quoting a contractor as saying "[t]he Iraqis' fury grew as they realized that Black-
water was untouchable").
18 See Alexandra Zavis, Army Interpreter Sentenced at Court-Martial, L.A. TIMES, June
24, 2008, at A3.
19 See Deborah Hastings, Contractors Incited Prison Abuse, Report Says, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 24, 2004, at A12 ("CACI and Titan employees were key participants in the
'sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses' at Abu Ghraib, said the Taguba report."); see
also Tracie Rozhon, 6 Members of Elite Navy Force Sue News Agency Over Photos, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2004, at A16 ("Mr. Huston said the photos had appeared in Arab news media
and on anti-American billboards in Cuba.").
20 See Jad Mouawad, Shell Agrees to Settle Abuse Case for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9,
2009, at B 1 (stating that the settlement was "a striking sum given that the company has denied
any wrongdoing").
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ment of certain pro-democracy emails led to their arrest and torture.2 1 In
2004, Unocal settled a lawsuit brought by fifteen Burmese refugees who
accused the company of complicity in the murder, rape, and torture that
accompanied the construction of its oil pipeline in Burma.22 From the
abuses of colonialism, 23 to the Holocaust,2 4 to Apartheid,2 5 the role of
corporations in human rights abuses is all too common.
This Note aims to show that a criminal statute with extraterritorial
jurisdiction is the proper remedy to this plague of corporate abuses
abroad. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) already holds corpo-
rations criminally liable for accounting and bribery crimes that they com-
mit overseas.2 6 Congress need only amend the FCPA to address a larger
scope of crimes, including human rights abuses by corporations such as
Blackwater or Unocal.2 7 That our statutes make a crime of a corpora-
tion's overseas accounting fraud but not overseas murder is an absurdity
that demands change.
Part I of this Note will examine some of the existing possible legal
solutions to this "Blackwater problem." As all are inadequate, Part II
looks to the FCPA, which has proven to be promisingly effective in ad-
dressing extraterritorial crimes by U.S. corporations. 2 8 In order to under-
stand why U.S. law does not already criminalize human rights abuses,
Part HI looks to the historical relationship between corporations and gov-
ernment, beginning with the underpinnings of that relationship in Roman
law and political theory. Part III will then examine the problems that
arose from British joint-stock trading companies and American business
corporations of the Gilded Age. Applying the solutions employed by the
21 Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007,
at D4.
22 See Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Human Rights Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004,
at Al; see also John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003) (granting rehearing en banc).
23 See discussion infra Part III.C.
24 See Sean D. Murphy, Nazi-Era Claims Against German Companies, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 682 (2000). For details on the role of one American corporation, see EDWIN BLACK, IBM
AND THE HOLOCAUST (2008).
25 See 6 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 156-71 (2003),
available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/rep.pdf (explaining the role of business
in supporting the Apartheid regime).
26 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2006).
27 The proposition of using the FCPA as a basis for addressing human rights is not new.
See, e.g., Logan Michael Breed, Note, Regulating Our 21st-Century Ambassadors: A New
Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1005
(2002). This Note differs in its focus on the Blackwater problem and the historical context of
corporate abuses.
28 This Note recommends that Congress amend the FCPA to cover crimes such as those
that occurred at Nisour Square. Of course, due to ex post facto limitations, these amendments
would only serve to prevent future crimes, not punish this individual crime. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
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British and U.S. governments during that time, Part IV will explain how
expanding the FCPA by adopting new human rights provisions would
address the Blackwater problem and many of the other human rights
abuses that are likely to occur in the age of globalization.
I. THE AVAILABLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS
A. Iraqi Law
One obvious solution to the Blackwater29 problem would be to
eliminate the blanket immunity that the Provisional Authority granted in
the first place. In fact, the U.S. and Iraqi governments have agreed to do
just that.30 Unfortunately, this approach creates as many problems as it
solves. One barrier to relinquishing authority to Iraqi courts is that
"there is little confidence that trials would be fair and defendants in those
[Iraqi] courts have few of the legal protections that are mandatory in the
United States."'31 The trial of Saddam Hussein displayed the shortcom-
ings of the Iraqi judicial system to the world as Saddam's enemies inter-
vened to ensure his conviction and eventual execution. 32 The lack of due
process in the Hussein trial has led some to question the extent of the rule
of law in Iraq. 33 These questions cast doubt on the possibility that Black-
water guards would get a fair trial in Iraq.
B. International Law
A second possible solution would be to address the Blackwater
problem through international law. Professor Richard Morgan proposes
using the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Protocol I to
hold military contractors responsible for their crimes. 34 He argues that
the international nature of their acts and the possibility of a race to the
bottom in domestic regulations call for a solution rooted in international
law, a new treaty regime, or evolving customary international law. 35
29 Blackwater has now renamed itself Xe. See The Associated Press, Blackwater
Changes Its Name to Xe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A10. For simplicity, this Note will use
the name Blackwater throughout.
30 See Sabrina Tavemise et al., U.S. Concession on Immunity for Contractors, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A 1l.
31 Rubin & von Zeilbauer, supra note 16, at Al.
32 See Neil Genzlinger, The Backstage Intrigues at a Show Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2008, at CI I ("The trial that resulted in Mr. Hussein's hanging in late 2006 did not conform to
the American Way.") (reviewing The Trial ofSaddam Hussein (PBS television broadcast Oct.
12, 2008)).
33 See John F. Bums, Western Lawyers Say Iraq Discarded Due Process in Hussein
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A17 (explaining how Prime Minister Maliki "forced the
resignation of one" judge "to avert the possibility" of life imprisonment in place of execution).
34 See Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firns under International Law, 9 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 213, 218 (2008).
35 See id. at 244-45.
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Other scholars have come to similar conclusions regarding human
rights abuses by corporations more generally. Professor Steven Ratner
argues that, in light of the problems that emerge between corporations
and states in the context of globalization-including the very erosion of
state power 36-"[a]ny answer not depending exclusively on diverse and
possibly parochial national visions of human rights and enterprise re-
sponsibility must come from international law."' 37 International law, Pro-
fessor Ratner argues, would eliminate the uncertainty that comes from ad
hoc responses by legislatures and international organizations. 38 The so-
lution then would be a marriage between corporate law and international
law, imposing certain obligations on corporations in order to protect
human rights.39
Unfortunately, a solution rooted in international law is also prob-
lematic. First, there is the ongoing debate over whether international law
really is law at all. International law lacks the backing of a legislature,
an executive body, and a judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction.40 These
qualities have led some to conclude that international law is more 'posi-
tive morality' than law.41 While Professor Ratner warns of the uncer-
tainty that comes from ad hoc responses by different legislatures, 42 there
is also an inherent uncertainty in trying to create law without any of the
traditional lawmaking mechanisms.4 3
Second, even if international law is law, there is another concern in
finding a forum to apply it. Even if Professor Morgan were right that
international law provides all the necessary tools to address something
like the Blackwater problem, he does not address whether the United
States would ever subject itself or its citizens to such an international
criminal trial.4" To date, the United States has resolved not to let the
International Criminal Court try its citizens.45 In making its decision,
36 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 447 (2001).
37 Id. at 448.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 449; see also ANDREW KUPER, DEMOCRACY BEYOND BORDERS: JUSTICE AND
REPRESENTATION IN GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 137-90 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (explaining the
potential of United Nations institutions in promoting a new non-state democracy).
40 See JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
14-15 (Longman 2003).
41 Id. at 15; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) ("Who would bother to inquire as to why a system of rules is
obeyed when there is little evidence either of a system or of obedience?").
42 See Ratner, supra note 36, at 448.
43 See John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 303, 308
(2006).
44 See generally Morgan, supra note 34.
45 See 22 U.S.C. § 7421(11) (2006) ("The United States will not recognize the jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Court over United States nationals.").
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Congress cited the lack of constitutional protections available in the In-
ternational Criminal Court.46 This same concern would apply to any in-
ternational tribunal; thus, one could conclude that the United States
would not fully cooperate with any international criminal court.
The situation is little better in U.S. courts. In practice, American
judges give short shrift to international law in their courtrooms. Using
the many rules available under the doctrine of "judicial provincialism," 47
judges may find ways to prevent a hearing on international law cases, to
prevent international law from providing the rule of decision in a case, or
to hinder the proper handling of international law. 48 Even if U.S. judges
decide to use international law in their decisions, supplanting domestic
law with international law raises yet another constitutional concern.49
These debates over the merits of international law are extensive, and
their details are beyond the scope of this Note, but they do illustrate the
overall concerns about international law's ability to protect human rights.
For now, one can conclude that human rights require.a more solid foun-
dation than international law alone can provide.
C. Domestic Law
For lack of other options-if nothing else-U.S. domestic law pro-
vides the greatest potential for holding criminals such as the Blackwater
guards liable. There are only a handful of U.S. statutes that have the
extraterritorial reach to extend to Iraq. This Note will address three: the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). This section ex-
amines MEJA and ATS, but concludes that both are inadequate solutions
to the problem of holding corporations liable for .crimes committed
abroad.
Of these three laws, MEJA is seemingly the most on point.50 The
statute covers members of the Armed Forces or those accompanying the
46 See id. § 7421(7).
47 See Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 4, 8-9 (1995). McFadden explains that judicial provincialism provides rules that judges
may use to marginalize international law, including personal jurisdiction requirements, sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction requirements, foreign sovereign immunity, standing requirements, the
political-question doctrine, the forum non conveniens doctrine, the lis alibi pendens doctrine,
and the act of state doctrine as possible rules available for the purposes of judicial provincial-
ism. Id. at 8-9.
48 Id. at 8.
49 See McGinnis, supra note 43, at 308 ("[U]nlike democratically made laws or constitu-
tions, transnational legal materials currently do not derive from a process that gives us reason
to believe that they are good enough to impeach the presumptive beneficence of our own
democratic law.").
50 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2006).
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Armed Forces, 51 a definition that would include military contractors. 52
In addition, MEJA applies to any serious criminal acts that occur outside
of the United States,5 3 allowing for prosecution under U.S. law for those
acts. 54 Although MEJA offers a "significant expansion of American
criminal law over crimes committed on foreign soil,"55 and although the
United States has attempted to indict the Blackwater guards under
MEJA, 56 it is not a clear solution to the problem at hand for three
reasons.
First, and most importantly, MEJA would only apply to the individ-
ual guards: Blackwater USA itself cannot be prosecuted under MEJA. 57
Second, it remains to be seen whether a conviction of the guards is even
possible: the government's initial indictment under MEJA has been dis-
missed.58 To date, there has been only one successful prosecution of a
contractor under MEJA, and this involved child pornography.5 9 Moreo-
ver, MEJA has never applied to contractors working for the State Depart-
ment, as with the Blackwater guards at Nisour Square. 60 Third, a
prosecution under MEJA will not likely clarify the law in the least. If
there is a prosecution under MEJA, it will be by twisting the statute into
a "an unprecedented use of the law," likely producing "protracted, tech-
nical arguments aimed at scuttling the case well before a jury has the
opportunity to evaluate the guards' actions."61 Criminal law deserves
more clarity than this extension of MEJA can provide. Finally, setting
aside this dubious application of MEJA, it would certainly not address
any of the other human rights abuses that corporations commit
overseas.
62
An alternative to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act is the
Alien Tort Statute, which provides for original jurisdiction in federal dis-
trict courts for "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
51 See id. § 3261.
52 See id. § 3267(1)(A)(ii)-(iii).
53 See id. § 3261.
54 See id. §§ 3261-62.
55 See K. Elizabeth Waits, Note, Avoiding the "Legal Bermuda Triangle": The Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act's Unprecedented Expansion of U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Nationals, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 493, 497 (2006).
56 See Scahill, Justice, of a Sort, supra note 8; see also Savage, supra note 8, at Al.
57 See Scahill, Justice, of a Sort, supra note 8; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2006).
58 See Savage, supra note 8, at Al.
59 See Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused Jurisdictional Regime for
Private Military Contractors During Contingency Operations, 76 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1308,
1316 & n.53 (2008).
60 See id. at 1315.
61 Ginger Thompson & James Risen, Plea by Blackwater Guards Helps Indict 5 Others,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at A12 (internal quotations omitted).
62 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'63 Most
promisingly, foreigners have used the ATS to sue corporations in federal
court for breaches of customary international law with respect to human
rights abuses. 64
Nonetheless, enforcing human rights through the ATS is problem-
atic, and thus far, no corporation has been held liable under the ATS. 65
First, the ATS's subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to breaches of the
"law of nations," a term that courts have interpreted narrowly. 66 Second,
as a private action, a party suing under the ATS must bear its own costs,
a disincentive for victims, particularly if they still reside in a foreign
country.67 Finally, an ATS claim is a tort claim rather than a criminal
action, and there is a difference between a "breach" and a "crime," be-
tween mere civil liability and the moral condemnation of breaking a
criminal law. 68 Consequently, if the United States is serious about con-
demning the most heinous corporate abuses, it should look to the crimi-
nal law rather than tort law.
By process of elimination, one finds the traits necessary to address
the Blackwater problem in particular and overseas corporate abuses in
general: the United States needs a criminal statute with extraterritorial
reach and a purpose broad enough to address a wide variety of corporate
crimes. For that, one must turn to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
63 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that subject-matter jurisdiction exists in suit based on universally accepted norms of
international law, regardless of party's nationality). See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Imple-
menting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort
Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 116 (2004) ("Filartiga transformed the [Alien Tort
Statute] into a tool for foreigners to seek redress in federal courts for a variety of abuses
committed by governments around the world.").
64 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103-08 (2d Cit. 2000);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Curtis A. Bradley,
The Alien Tort Statute and Article II, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 589 (2002) (noting the expan-
sion of the ATS to suits against multinational corporations).
65 One law firm proclaims as much to its clients: "The good news is that no company-
whether through trial or at some earlier stage-has yet to lose an [ATS] case." Kelley Drye &
Warren LLP, Alien Tort Claims Act: A Once Dormant Statute Resurrects with Implications
and Potential Liability for Corporations, http://www.kelleydrye.com/resource-center/global-
litigationusa/20090126/01 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
66 See Breed, supra note 27, at 1016.
67 See David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting In America: Comparing, Contrasting,
and Combining the "American Rule" and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
583, 585 (2005) ("[T]he 'American rule' which has stood for over 200 years, is one in which
each party must bear its own costs for litigation, regardless of the outcome.").
68 See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and The Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. REv. 201, 206 (1996) ("The shared quality-the defining characteristic--of all civil
liability is that it is not criminal liability; it lacks the societal condemnation that criminal
liability traditionally suggests.").
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II. THE FCPA: PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE
A. The Purpose of the FCPA
In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) in response to a series of foreign bribery scandals by a number
of Fortune 500 companies. 69 Investigations by the Watergate Special
Prosecutor and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) revealed
the existence of slush funds that corporate officials were using to finance
contributions to the Nixon reelection campaign and other domestic politi-
cal campaigns, as well as to bribe foreign officials.70 Through the SEC's
voluntary disclosure program, 400 companies disclosed overseas pay-
ments totaling in excess of $300 million.71 "The revelations," Charles
McManis wrote in 1976, "have shaken foreign governments, rocked
American corporate management, and tarnished the image of American
private enterprise both at home and abroad." 72
In arriving at a legislative solution to these revelations, Congress
invoked many of the same concerns as McManis: overseas bribery is
unethical, unnecessary, erodes public confidence in the free market, and
casts a shadow over all U.S. corporations. 73 In strong language, the
House Report concluded that bribery "is counter to the moral expecta-
tions and values of the American public. But not only is it unethical, it is
bad business as well."7 4
When President Carter signed the Act into law on December 20,
1977, he joined Congress in its concerns about corrupt practices. 75 "I
share Congress' [s] belief," he stated, "that bribery is ethically repugnant
and competitively unnecessary." 76 In addition, he spoke to diplomatic
concerns: "Corrupt practices between corporations and public officials
overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm
our relations with other countries. '77 In keeping with this purpose, the
69 See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 241-44 (2001).
70 Id. at 241.
71 Id. at 244. The chairperson of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation admitted to paying an
estimated $22 million in overseas bribes between 1970 and 1975. Exxon admitted to contrib-
uting over $46 million in Italian political contributions alone. Id. at 241 n.15.
72 Charles R. McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Ap-
proach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 215 (1976).
73 H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).
74 Id.
75 See President's Statement on Signing S.305 Into Law, II Pua. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20,
1977).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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FCPA provides tough criminal sanctions for U.S. issuers and other enti-
ties that commit bribery abroad. 78
B. The Provisions of the FCPA
The FCPA both regulates accounting and prevents bribery by U.S.
companies and issuers. On accounting, the FCPA requires issuers to
"make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable de-
tail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer. ''79 Issuers must also create a system of internal ac-
counting controls that provide reasonable assurances that transactions
have the authorization of management.80 A person or corporation will be
criminally liable under this statute if there is a knowing circumvention or
failure to implement a system of internal accounting controls, or know-
ing falsification of any book, record, or account.81
In addition, the FCPA criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials. 82
For the purposes of the FCPA, the elements of bribery are that a U.S.
issuer, domestic concern, or any legal person 83 makes use of the means
of interstate commerce in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to
pay, or authorization to pay anything of value to any foreign official,
foreign political party, or official thereof, or any candidate for foreign
political office, or other person, knowing that the payment to that person
would be passed on to a foreign official, political party, or candidate.84
The crime must be for the purpose of corruptly influencing "any act or
decision of a foreign official in his official capacity, inducing an action
or omission to act in violation of a lawful duty, or securing any improper
78 An "issuer" is defined as any entity that issues a security registered pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 781 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I(a), 78m(a)
(2006).
79 Id. at § 78m(b)(2)(A). The purpose of the accounting and bookkeeping provisions of
the FCPA is to allow the SEC to better discover improprieties that would not be as apparent
under existing accounting systems. See Ned Sebelius, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 AM.
CmiM. L. Rev. 579, 584 (2008).
80 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iii).
81 See id. § 78m(b)(5). Violations of these accounting provisions can lead to a range of
punishments for an employee, from a fine to a prohibition from serving as an officer or direc-
tor of a public company. Sebelius, supra note 79, at 586.
82 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd(2)(a), 78dd(3)(a).
83 The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions are broader than its accounting provisions in that
the anti-bribery provisions apply to issuers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a). The anti-bribery pro-
visions also apply to domestic concerns. See id. § 78dd-2. A "domestic concern" is defined as
"any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or
sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is
organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or common-
wealth of the United States." Id. § 78dd-2(h)(l).
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (2006) (issuers); id. § 78dd-2 (domestic concerns); id. § 78dd-
3 (any person).
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advantage. '85 Finally, an offense under the anti-bribery provisions has a
knowledge standard: "Knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person
actually believes that such circumstance does not exist."86
The FCPA is unique in its extraterritorial jurisdiction. The FCPA
applies to issuers, domestic concerns, and-since 1998-"any person." 87
As applied to U.S. issuers and persons, there is no requirement of a terri-
torial nexus between the corrupt act and the United States.88 The FCPA
may reach foreign agents and employees who have little contact with the
United States.89 Likewise, the FCPA could create liability for a domestic
concern through the actions of one of its foreign agents, even if that
agent has no contact with the United States.90
The SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ) are responsible for the
enforcement of and prosecution under the FCPA.91 The maximum pen-
alty for a natural person who violates the accounting provisions is a fine
of $5,000,000 and imprisonment for up to twenty years.92 An individual
who willfully violates the bribery provisions may face a fine up to
$100,000 and five years in prison. 93 The maximum penalty for a corpo-
ration for willful violations of the accounting provisions is a fine of
$25,000,000. 94 The maximum penalty for a corporation for willful viola-
tion of the anti-bribery provisions is a fine of $2,000,000.9 5
C. The Success of the FCPA
The FCPA has proven effective in addressing bribery beyond the
borders of the United States. Ten years after creating the FCPA, the
Senate noted "the significant contribution Congress made in enacting the
[statute] ."96 A decade later, President Clinton reaffirmed the importance
85 Id. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(i), (2)(A)(i), (3)(A)(i) (issuers); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(i),
(2)(A)(i), (3)(A)(i) (domestic concerns); id. § 78dd-3(a)(l)(A)(i), (2)(A)(i), (3)(A)(i) (any
person).
86 Id. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(B) (issuers); id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B) (domestic concerns); id. § 78dd-
3(f)(3)(B) (any person).
87 See Sebelius, supra note 79, at 588-90; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (issuers); id.
§ 78dd-2 (domestic concerns); id. § 78dd-3 ("any person").
88 Sebelius, supra note 79, at 590.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 590 n.69; see also Lucinda A. Low & Timothy P. Trenkle, U.S. Antibribery
Law Goes Global: Standards Tightening Up, Bus. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1999, at 16-17 (not-
ing the global expansion of the FCPA under its 1998 amendments).
91 The SEC has jurisdiction over issuers under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-(a)(1) (2006). The At-
torney General has jurisdiction over all other domestic concerns and persons. See id. §§ 78dd-
2(d), 78dd-3(d).
92 Id. § 78ff(a).
93 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B4.1 (2009).
94 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
95 Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A) (domestic concerns), 78ff(c) (issuers).
96 H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, pt. 1, at 916 (1988).
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of the Act, declaring, "We will continue our leadership in the interna-
tional fight against corruption.
97
In sharp contrast to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,98
the DOJ and the SEC have enforced the FCPA with frequency and sever-
ity. 99 In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of inves-
tigations by the SEC, and both the SEC and DOJ have sought larger
penalties.' 0 0 In 2004, for the first time, the SEC required a company to
disgorge profits of unlawful FCPA activities; that practice is now rou-
tine. 10 1 More proactively, corporate self-monitoring to ensure FCPA
compliance has increased, as has voluntary disclosure arising from cor-
porations' internal investigations.10 2 While the FCPA landscape contin-
ues to evolve, all signs point to heightened scrutiny and graver
consequences for violators. 10 3
More promising still, the FCPA has served as a model for both in-
ternational law and the domestic laws of other nations. While Congress
was working on the provisions of the FCPA, it called on U.S. negotiators
to seek international cooperation in a variety of fora. 104 As early as
1975-two years before passing the FCPA-the United States was able
to convince the Organization of American States to condemn bribery,
though that resolution "provided no mechanism for enforcement."' 1 5 In
that same year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion against bribery, but its Economic and Social Council declined to
outlaw corrupt payments in international trade. 10 6
After the FCPA's passage, and through the efforts of the United
States, the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) passed a resolution against bribery, en-
couraging member countries to revise their laws and regulations to
97 Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, II PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998).
98 See Hurst, supra note 59, at 1316 & n.53 (discussing the lack of enforcement of
MEJA).
99 See Danforth Newcomb, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to
Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (as of June 26,
2007), in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT
RISKS: FALL 2007 at 385-94 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 1619, 2007)
(providing summary of foreign bribery prosecutions under FCPA).
100 See id. at 388-89.
101 Id. at 388.
102 Id. at 392-93.
103 Id. at 394.
104 See Brown, supra note 69, at 259-62.
105 Id. at 262.
106 Id. at 262-63.
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discourage bribery. 10 7 The OECD's Committee on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises issued a list of recommendations that
set forth "concrete and meaningful steps" to address bribery.10 8 The
OECD adopted those recommendations and established mechanisms for
monitoring compliance and for enforcement; it also encouraged its mem-
bers to "assert aggressively their territorial jurisdiction and nationality
jurisdiction to better combat bribery."10 9 This position marked a "sweep-
ing change in the way the industrialized countries of Europe regarded
international bribery."" l0 Since then, there has been "a decade of re-
markable international activity aimed at combating official corrup-
tion."1 1 Much of this international activity arises from the efforts of
American corporations, which have found an incentive in leveling the
regulatory playing field worldwide: the FCPA has thus leveraged Ameri-
can corporations on the side of fighting bribery. In all, the difference in
treatment of anti-bribery agreements before the FCPA and after could not
be starker.
Although many scholars have doubted the future positive impact of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," 2 the Act's history has proven its
effectiveness. By matching anti-corruption aspirations with the hard en-
forcement power of a state, the FCPA has created a snowball effect of
anti-corruption measures around the world. 113 Once Congress enacted
the FCPA and made it a focus of international relations, the OECD was
willing to take a hard stance on the issue; the OECD position further
encouraged other nations to craft domestic laws against bribery; this in
turn has led to a proliferation of anti-corruption treaties. 114 By enacting
the FCPA, Congress created a global dialogue on corruption that is lead-
ing to hard legal mechanisms around the world.115 The success of the
FCPA on the global stage provides yet another rebuttal to Professor
Ratner's argument for an international solution to corporate abuses: in-
ternational law only becomes effective after lawmakers codify it into do-
107 See id. at 264-67; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1121, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1424-25 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-06 (2006)) (urging the President to pursue an agreement with members of OECD).
108 Brown, supra note 69, at 265 (internal citation omitted).
109 Id. at 265, 268.
110 Id at 268.
111 Cecil Hunt, Recent Multilateral Measures to Combat Corruption, SN056 ALI-ABA
227, 232 (2008).
112 See, e.g., Christopher L. Hall, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Disad-
vantage, But for How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 303-06 (1994) (summarizing
criticisms that the FCPA has imposed a competitive disadvantage on U.S. firms). But see id. at
302 (noting that "[lilt is impossible to know with certainty the effects of the FCPA on United
States business abroad").
113 Id. at 311.
1 14 See Hunt, supra note I11.
115 See Hall, supra note 112, at 312.
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mestic law. To legislate through international law alone would only lead
to ineffective resolutions without any enforcement mechanisms of their
own.
III. THE FCPA DISCONNECT: THEORY AND HISTORY
A. The Theoretical Disconnect
For all the FCPA's success in combating bribery, it is also the
source of a conundrum. Although Congress enacted the FCPA to pre-
vent "ethically repugnant" behavior by corporations, the Act ignores
human rights abuses while throwing the book at corporate fraud. Had
Blackwater officials knowingly changed the figures in its accounting
books, the corporation would face a fine of up to $25,000,000 and its
employees could spend up to twenty years in jail." 6 But as it happens,
because Blackwater guards wrongfully killed seventeen civilians and un-
dermined U.S. interests in Iraq, they and their corporation find them-
selves in a legal loophole with no certain criminal liability. 117 It is not
hard to see that there is a disconnect in the extraterritorial law of the
United States. While U.S. law severely punishes the relatively harmless
act of accounting fraud, it offers no remedy for a corporation's acts of
brutal violence. This part will explain the origins of this disconnect.
From the beginning of corporations under Roman law to the rise of
the nation-state, there has been a tension between business corporations
and the government. Through a series of conflicts with corporations,
nations such as Britain and the United States have managed to curtail the
power of corporations within their own borders. They have so managed
their corporations that their corporate laws are more concerned with ac-
counting fraud than with murder. Problems ensue when, in the context
of globalization, corporations creep into countries unaccustomed to the
tensions between corporations and government-or at least with corpora-
tions of such magnitude-and those problems manifest themselves in
ways like the Blackwater problem. Fortunately, the history of the rela-
tionship between corporations and government provides a key to solving
these more recent problems.
116 See discussion supra Part II.C.
117 See discussion supra Part I. The irony is that Blackwater may eventually face charges
for the bribery that it allegedly committed in the aftermath of Nisour Square. See Mark Maz-
zetti & James Risen, Blackwater Said to Pursue Bribes to Iraq After 17 Died, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2009, at Al.
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B. The Historical Conundrum
Much of the tension between corporations and government derives
from their common origin in Roman law."18 One finds the first examples
of non-human entities entitled to certain rights in Ancient Rome. Al-
though many of these early corporations were private groups such as
trade guilds and burial societies, they also included civic institutions,
such as municipalities and even the Senate and the People of Rome. ' 19
In all cases, these entities had many of the privileges of a real person:
they could own property, inherit legacies, and appear in legal proceed-
ings. 12 0 They thus prove to be the forerunner of the modem corpora-
tion-both the corporation for business and that for government.
The common history of corporations and government leads to a co-
nundrum. On the one hand, the state has the power to make laws and
punish criminals-it is a very real force in the civic world. 12 1 On the
other, it is a legal artifice-a fiction-and is no different in substance
from the many corporations that it regulates. 122 Thomas Hobbes, who
perhaps more than anyone else sought to explain the power of the state,
helps answer this conundrum by identifying the process of authorization
that places the state over all other corporations. 123 Professor Quentin
Skinner explains that, for Hobbes, a person is no different from an actor
in his ability to stand in for another: "As Hobbes's theory continually
reminds us, persona is, in Latin, the ordinary word for a theatrical
mask."' 24 As such, a natural person can authorize someone else to re-
present him.1 25 Hobbes writes that "a person, is the same that an actor
is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate is to
act, or represent himself, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to
bear his person, or act in his name .... ,,126 Hobbes applied this idea of
representation to the concept of state power. 27
118 Blackstone writes that the credit of inventing the corporation "entirely belongs to the
Romans." F.W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 10 (David Runciman &
Magnus Ryan eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMEN-
TARMES 469).
119 See ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 76-78 (1994).
120 See id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See 3 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLrrCS: HOBBES AND CIVIL SCIENCE 182
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
124 Id. at 182.
125 See id. at 181-83.
126 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 106-07 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1651).
127 See id. at 111-15; see also SKINNER, supra note 123, at 201-03.
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Once someone authorizes another to act for him, he gives up his
rights to that representative. 128 For Hobbes, there is no equivocating on
this point: "When a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted
away his right; then he is said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder
those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of
tt.129it .... " 2
Such absolute rule through representation is necessary to avoid the
natural divisions present in mankind, "[f]or it is the unity of the repre-
senter, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one." 130
It is thus by authorizing the state to rule over them that citizens place all
persons, real and artificial, under the state's absolute rule. 131
C. The Age of the Trading Companies132
Since the state has become the dominant force in the modem era, it
is easy to forget that it is merely one of several types of corporations.
For all its power, the state remains a distant relative of the business cor-
poration, or as F.W. Maitland puts it, "a genus of which State and Corpo-
ration are species." 133 There have been times that states have been so
weak, or business corporations have been so strong, that such corpora-
tions have supplanted the state altogether. 134 Not long after Hobbes ar-
ticulated the source of a state's power, private corporations posed their
first challenge to state authority. 135 Beginning in the seventeenth cen-
tury, European trading monopolies operating in India, North America,
and Africa formed the foundations of private empires.136 Although the
British Crown chartered many such trading companies with an aim of
facilitating colonialism, these corporations often operated with a will of
their own. 137 Left to themselves in distant outposts, they took on all the
128 See HOBES, supra note 126, at 88.
129 Id. Skinner explains that once you have formed a covenant with another, "you must
leave it to your representative, who is now in possession of your right of action, to exercise it
at his discretion when acting in your name." SKINNER, supra note 123, at 186.
130 HOBBES, supra note 126, at 109. The natural state of man without this powerful repre-
sentative is, of course, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Id. at 84.
131 See SKINNER, supra note 123, at 198-203.
132 The joint-stock trading company is a useful example because it is in many ways the
model for the modem multinational. See NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD: How THE EAST INDIA COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL 22 (Pluto
Press 2006); see also id. at 18 ("If we are to fully understand our corporate present, then we
must understand our corporate past .... ").
133 MAITLAND, supra note 118, at 1.
134 See, e.g., PHILIP LAWSON, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: A HISTORY 86-102 (Longman
1993).
135 See ROBINS, supra note 132, at 23; see also J.R. SEELEY, THE EXPANSION OF EN-
GLAND, 165-70 (John Gross ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1883).
136 See ROBINS, supra note 132, at 23.
137 See SEELEY, supra note 135, at 168.
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trappings of a proper state, more closely resembling the governments that
purportedly regulated them than an ordinary business corporation. 138
In understanding the role of the trading companies in their respec-
tive territories, it is important to consider what qualifies as state action.
Under the traditional sociological definition-a definition of particular
significance for the Blackwater problem-a state is that "which holds a
'monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory.' "139
The history of the most famous trading companies proves that they were
more than mere businesses, but were closer to actual quasi-states that
held a monopoly of legitimate physical violence as well as many of the
other characteristics of a state.
1. The Honourable East India Company
The most famous of the giant trading companies, the Honourable
East India Company (HEIC), began in 1600, at the end of Elizabeth I's
reign.' 40 At its foundation, the HEIC was a joint-stock company whose
purpose was to trade English goods and gold for spices from the East
Indies. 141 After nearly two centuries of such a trade, the HEIC had trans-
formed itself into a political and territorial power of its own. 142
Left to itself in India, the HEIC created an environment suited to its
trade. More than anything else, such an environment required security,
and in the face of aggressive French rivals and Mogul rulers, this re-
quired troops and diplomacy. 143 For troops, the HEIC recruited locally,
and by 1765, the Company had an army of 9,000 Indians, grouped into at
least seven battalions, led by English and Indian officers.' 44 One histo-
rian has identified the source of the Company's dominance in India-
echoing Max Weber-as its "exclusive right to violence."1 45
138 See LAWSON, supra note 134, at 104-06; see also SEELEY, supra note 135, at 168-69.
139 MAX WEBER, POLITICAL WRITINGS 310-11 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1994). In his lecture on "The Profession and Vocation of Politics,"
Max Weber set out his enduring sociological definition of the state, a definition that he ap-
proaches from the perspective of means (Mittel). Id. at 310. "Violence," Weber argues, "is, of
course, not the normal or sole means used by the state. There is no question of that. But it is
the means specific to the state." Id.; see also James Q. Whitman, Between Self-Defense and
Vengeance/Between Social Contract and Monopoly of Violence, 39 TULSA L. REv. 901, 920
(2004) (noting that Weber wrote this in the context of associations competing with the state).
140 See LAWSON, supra note 134, at 5.
141 Id. at 20.
142 Id. at 86.
143 See id. at 89-93; ROBINS, supra note 132.
144 STEPHEN P. COHEN, THE INDIAN ARMY 8 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1971); see also SEEMA
ALAVI, THE SEPOYS AND THE COMPANY: TRADITION AND TRANSITION IN NORTHERN INDIA,
1770-1830 43-44 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (describing the popularity of the payment and
pension structure of the Company army).
145 ALAVI, supra note 144, at 3 (internal citation omitted).
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In tandem with its military force, the HEIC employed a heavy
amount of diplomacy, often inserting itself into the Mogul power struc-
ture. 146 Robert Clive, the HEIC's Commander-in-Chief in India, 147 took
the position of a jagirdar, a military command rank that came with a
small territory and its tax revenues. 148 Eventually, through Clive's skill-
ful use of his army and his Mogul allies, the Company took control of
three imperial provinces, including Bengal. 149 As one contemporary
noted, "This Empire has been acquired by a Company of
Merchants .. " 150
Not surprisingly, the British Parliament was wary of "a great empire
being created and ruled by Britons independent of the authority of the
British cabinet." 151 One nineteenth century historian wondered: "May
we not feel tempted to exclaim that it was an evil hour for England when
the daring genius of Clive turned a trading company into a political
Power, and inaugurated a hundred years of continuous conquest?" 152
Thus, between 1773 and 1858, Parliament set about taking back some of
that political power, 153 finally determining where "Company responsibil-
ities ended and those of the British government began." 154
To assert itself against the HEIC, Parliament introduced a number
of bills regulating practices in India itself.155 First, Prime Minister Pitt
passed the India Act of 1784, which allowed the King to appoint a Board
of Control that would supervise the civil and military government of the
HEIC. 156 The Act thus subordinated any political conduct of the Com-
pany to the national government. 157 Subsequent acts in 1813158 and
1833159 generally boosted the role of the British government at the ex-
pense of the Company. Finally, in 1858, in response to the Company's
inadequate response to India's Great Rebellion, the Crown took control
of governing India once and for all. 160
At the same time that Parliament was stripping the HEIC of most of
its political power, the British courts struck a blow of their own at the
146 See LAWSON, supra note 134, at 105-08.
147 Id. at 105.
148 Id. at 93.
149 Id. at 106.
150 Id.
151 C.H. PHILIPS, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: 1784-1834 23 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1961).
152 SEELEY, supra note 135, at 153.
153 See LAWSON, supra note 134, at 120-25.
154 Id. at 117.
155 Id. at 120; see also PHILIPS, supra note 151, at 33-34.
156 PHILIPS, supra note 151, at 33-34.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 195.
159 See LAWSON, supra note 134, at 159.
160 See id. at 160-62.
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political power of corporations: in 1846, the courts first applied the ultra
vires doctrine. 16 1 The doctrine limited corporations to the enumerated
activities that their charters laid out for them; outside of those activities,
the corporations were literally powerless. 162 Justice Brandeis later ex-
plained, in relation to American corporations, that by restricting corpora-
tions to certain enumerated activities, the state could limit corporations'
economic power and societal influence. 16 3 The ultra vires doctrine thus
reflected "society's wariness of large aggregations of economic power,"
and it served the state's interest in keeping each corporation "within the
narrow bounds of specific activity."'164
2. The Hudson's Bay Company
In the same century that Elizabeth I chartered the Honourable East
India Company, Charles II chartered the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC)
and made its first directors "true lords and proprietors" of all the sea and
lands of Hudson Bay in present day Canada.1 65 Like the East India
Company, the HBC formed an empire out of its holdings and its fur
trade.166 Also like the East India Company, the HBC founded its empire
on security, 16 7 designing its settlements on a defensive model, complete
with redoubts, parapets, and cannons. 168 Within the walls of these forts,
and under the HBC flag, the Company maintained a martial spirit based
161 See Colman v. E. Counties Ry. Co., (1846), 10 Beav. 1, 50 Eng. Rep. 481, 486 (Rolls
Ct.); see also Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegal-
ity (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L.
REV. 1279, 1302-03 (2001) (discussing the history and significance of the ultra vires
doctrine).
162 See Stephen J. Leacock, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United
States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph
of Experience Over Logic, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 67, 76 & n.52 (2006); see also Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective
on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 767, 799 (2005) ("The ultra vires
doctrine represented the ability of the state to require corporations to adhere to their charter
163 See Greenfield, supra note 161, at 1302; see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent
in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations.").
164 Greenfield, supra note 161, at 1302-03.
165 1 PETER C. NEWMAN, COMPANY OF ADVENTURERS 84 (Penguin Books 1985) [herein-
after NEWMAN, ADVENTURERS] (quoting the HBC charter of 1670).
166 Id. at 2.
167 See RAYMOND CALLAHAN, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND ARMY REFORM,
1783-1798 39 (Harv. Univ. Press 1972) ("[Tlhe Company's power rested upon its army.").
For a general discussion of the East India Company's reliance on this private army, see id. at
1-13. See also Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 387, 435-36 (2007) (explain-
ing that, by the late eighteenth century, the army had grown to 60,000 soldiers).
168 See NEWMAN, ADVENTURERS, supra note 165, at 167 (noting also that despite the
HBC's militaristic objectives, its forts were often poorly designed to deflect enemy attack.
One fort boasted a moat with a fixed bridge running over it, while in others firewood was
stacked close to wooden walls that could be easily set ablaze).
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on practices taken from the Royal Navy. 169 So complete was the HBC's
hold over its men that it maintained its own calendar, based on its incep-
tion in 1670, rather than the birth of Jesus of Nazareth. 170
With these forts as its base, the HBC routinely dealt in violence
within its territories. Following a bloody skirmish,171 it waged a war
against its chief rival, the Montreal-based Northwest Company, 172 a war
that included code 173 and mercenaries. 174 The prolonged guerilla war-
fare was so violent and unrestrained that on May 1, 1817, the Governor-
in-Chief of Canada issued a royal proclamation against "open warfare in
the Indian Territories."'] 75
Although the war with its corporate rival was fierce, the HBC's use
of violence against the local tribes was fiercer still. In one telling inci-
dent, in 1828, certain Puget Sound natives killed an HBC employee. 176
The local HBC officer, Dr. John McLoughlin, sent a party by boat and
another by land to attack the natives' village. 177 Together, the two par-
ties burnt the village and killed twenty-one natives; the families of those
killed executed the murderers themselves in order to placate the HBC's
death squads. 178 In all, McLoughlin writes, "the whole expedition was
most judiciously conducted . "...1,179 This incident was not unique. It
169 See id. at 169-73. Unfortunately, the HBC's success in conditioning militancy in its
employees fared no better than its construction of forts; participation in drills depended largely
on local conditions and the militancy of the local officers. Id. at 167. True espirit de corps
existed among only "the best Bay men." Id. at 169. To encourage appropriate militancy in its
remaining employees, the HBC awarded cash payouts to those injured in battle: £30 was paid
for any employee who lost an arm or a leg in defense of a fort. Id. at 167.
170 See id. at 172 n.2.
171 See 2 PETER NEWMAN, CAESARS OF THE WILDERNESS 174-75 (Penguin Books 1987)
[hereinafter NEWMAN, CAESARS].
172 See id. at 175-76.
173 Id. at 184.
174 Id. at 176-77.
175 Id. at 176. Not surprisingly, the war ended with the merger of the two companies in
1821. Id. at 207.
176 See id. at 285-87.
177 Id., see also Letter from John McLoughlin to Governor, Deputy Governor, and Com-
mittee of the Hudson's Bay Company (July 10, 1828), in 4 JOHN McLOUGHLIN, THE LETrERS
OF JOHN McLOUGHLIN FROM FORT VANCOUVER TO THE GOVERNOR AND COMMITTEE, FIRST
SERIES, 1825-38 57-58 (E. E. Rich ed., 1941) ("[I]t is for our personal security that we should
be respected by them [the natives], & nothing could make us more contemptible in their eyes
than allowing such a cold blooded assassination of our People to pass unpunished .... ").
178 NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 285-87. For a full explanation of the exploit,
see Letter from John McLoughlin to Governor, Deputy Governor, and Committee of the Hud-
son's Bay Company (undated), in LETTERS OF JOHN McLououuL.n, supra note 177, at 63-66
[hereinafter McLoUGHLN, Undated Letter].
179 McLoUGHLIN, Undated Letter, supra note 178, at 65.
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was through such acts as this that Hudson's Bay Company officials es-
tablished their brand of justice throughout their territories. 180
At the same time that the HBC was establishing its control over the
tribes of the Pacific Northwest, the territory itself had become a source of
conflict between British and American diplomats. 8" The Americans
claimed ownership of the Oregon Country through first discovery and
settlement; the British countered by asserting, among other things, the
right of occupancy, pointing to the presence of the HBC, a British com-
pany. 18 2 Stuck in a stalemate, in 1827, the two countries agreed to renew
the Joint Occupancy Treaty of 1818.183
Sharing the land between these two powers, however, could not last.
For British diplomats, the aim in any treaty negotiation was to hold on to
as much territory as possible.' 84 Fittingly, the British foreign secretary
from 1822-1827 was George Canning, "a true disciple of Pitt, an intense
nationalist and imperialist."' 18 5 It is no surprise then that, on the Oregon
Question, Canning advocated for "the undisputed Possession of the
whole Country on the Right Bank of the Upper Columbia, and a free
issue for its Produce by the Channel of that River." 186
The HBC was of no help to the British in furthering such ambitions.
Against British interests, the HBC advanced American claims to the area
by directly aiding American settlers and explorers in the greater North-
180 See, e.g., NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 285-87 (describing a deadly "melee"
that followed McLoughlin's dispatch of an armed schooner to meet a Clatsop chief who had
refused to cooperate with recovery of goods from a shipwreck).
181 See 1 CHARLES HENRY CAREY, HISTORY OF OREGON 455-56, 467-75 (Pioneer Histor-
ical Publ'g Co. 1922). The prior settlement by treaty of Spanish and Russian claims had, by
1825, given rise to America and Great Britain's territorial dispute over rights to the land west
of the Rocky Mountains. The British also contested the American theory of title by prior
discovery, claiming that it was based on the "casual voyage of a trading vessel." See id. at
472.
182 See id. at 470-72.
183 See id. at 478.
184 For example, during negotiation of the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), British and French
diplomats agreed to uphold the doctrine of ubi possidetis, or "the territory remains with the
possessor at the end of the conflict." See TRAVERS Twiss, OREGON TERRITORY, ITS HISTORY
AND DISCOVERY 150 (D. Appleton & Co. 1846).
185 FREDERICK MERK, ALBERT GALLATIN AND THE OREGON PROBLEM: A STUDY IN AN-
GLo-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Harv. Univ. Press, 1950), reprinted in TH-E OREGON QUESTIrON:
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND POLrTCS 99, 155 (Am. Hist. Ass'n 1967). The
London Times described Canning as "an eloquent expounder and advocate of that policy
which fixed a lever on every foreign soil whereby to raise the British empire to honour and
prosperity." Id. (quoting TIMES (London), Oct. 16, 1827, at 3).
186 JOHN S. GALBRAITH, THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY AS AN IMPERIAL FACTOR 180
(Univ. of Cal. Press 1957) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY] (quoting letter
from Canning to British Commissioners, May 31, 1924). Canning and the HBC agreed that the
territory between the Columbia River and the forty-ninth parallel, as well as access to the river,
were critical to the British fur trade and communication between posts. Id.
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west, albeit in exchange for a healthy profit.187 Trading posts such as
Idaho's Fort Hall provided settlers with necessary food and supplies. 188
In its Pacific Northwest post of Fort Vancouver, the HBC set up saw-
mills, flourmills, and farms. 189 Stories abound of Oregon settlers expres-
sing debts of gratitude for these amenities. 190 Of course, the HBC was
motivated by the business that these new settlers offered the outpost. 19 1
At Fort Hall, for example, the fort's Chief Trader realized the potential
business from those crossing the Oregon Trail. 192 Between 1842 and
1851, the post recorded sizeable profits in the sale of flour, rice, coffee,
sugar, and other staples to these American immigrants. 193 For Dr. Mc-
Loughlin, Chief Factor of Fort Vancouver, it was certain "that the Com-
pany's future would be best served by his sometimes costly efforts to
treat the growing influx of settlers as potential customers rather than un-
wanted pests."'1 94 Although this reasoning may have helped the Com-
pany's balance sheets, it did not serve the British government's attempt
to hold on to its territory in the Oregon Country. 195
By facilitating the American settlement of Oregon, the Hudson's
Bay Company dealt a mortal blow to Britain's claim to the territory.
Around the 1840s, Americans began to make up a sizeable presence in
187 See 2 E. E. RICH, HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY: 1670-1870 171 (Macmillan 1959) ("[Bly
1844 [McLoughlin] had lent goods and seed to the amount of over six thousand pounds upon
very little security."); NATHANIEL J. WYETH, THE JOURNALS OF CAPTAIN NATHANIEL J. WY-
ETH 22 (Ye Galleon Press 1969) (1899) ("[S]topped at a saw mill belonging to the H. B.
Co ..... [W]e were treated by [the company director] with the greatest kindness. He gave us
moc[c]asins and food in plenty.").
188 See GALBiRArrH, HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, supra note 186, at 108 (describing HBC
profits from the sale of basic supplies to American settlers at Fort Hall).
189 NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 285.
190 See, e.g., WYETH, supra note 187, at 22 ("I was received with the utmost kindness and
Hospitality by Doct. McLauchland [McLoughlin] the acting Gov. of the place .... Our people
were supplied with food and shelter from the rain ....").
191 GALBRAITH, HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, supra note 186, at 108.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 289-90. There is some disagreement as to
McLoughlin's motives for dealing with the American settlers. One view portrays him as an
administrator more concerned with "acting according to the dictates of his conscience" than
"fattening the Company's balance sheets." Id. He did violate HBC policy by extending credit
to needy Americans, however, McLoughlin's aid to Americans can also be seen in an eco-
nomic or pragmatic light. See, e.g., RICH, supra note 187, at 717; Frederick Merk, The Oregon
Pioneers and the Boundary, in AMERICAN HISTORICAL REvIEw XXIX (July 1924), reprinted in
THE OREGON QUESTION, supra note 185, at 235, 247-48 [hereinafter Merk, Pioneers] (sug-
gesting McLoughlin provided American parties with resources primarily to prevent ill-will that
could lead to hostile, even violent interactions with the HBC); see also GALBRAITH, HUDSON'S
BAY COMPANY, supra 186, at 190 ("McLoughlin's preoccupation was with trade .... He was
devoted to the enlargement of profits for his Company and himself, and his actions in Oregon
were dominated by a mercantile motivation.").
195 See RICH, supra note 187, at 737-38.
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the Oregon Country, particularly south of the Columbia River. 196 Their
growing presence tipped the diplomatic scales sufficiently that the
United States had a solid claim to the entire Oregon Country, aiding the
government in its boundary dispute with the British. 197 By June 15,
1846, both governments agreed to a border on the forty-ninth parallel,
thus leaving the United States with all of modern-day Oregon and Wash-
ington. 198 In aiding the aggressive American settlement of Oregon, the
HBC helped the United States acquire all of the Oregon Country, far
more territory than the British had been willing to cede in previous diplo-
matic negotiations.1 99
As American pioneers built up their own settlements and institu-
tions, the HBC lost much of its advantage in the area.200 Shortly after
the 1846 treaty, the U.S. government extinguished all the private prop-
erty rights of the Hudson's Bay Company and its subsidiaries. 20 1 In Brit-
ish Columbia, however, the Company still maintained its position as the
196 See Merk, Pioneers, supra note 194, at 236 (stating that 5,000 Americans had settled
in the Oregon Country by 1846); RicH, supra note 187 at 717 (noting large immigrations in
1843-45 and the subsequent influx of American traders). It would be difficult for the HBC to
claim ignorance that aiding American settlers would in turn advance American claims to the
region. Prior to the War of Spanish Succession, the HBC had challenged French claims in
Canada on the grounds that the French had acquiesced on their title by discovery because they
had not properly settled the territory. See Twiss, supra note 184, at 125. As such, the 1713
Treaty of Utrecht ceded all French claims to the Company's territory. See id. at 148-49.
197 See GALBRArrH, HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, supra note 186, at 177 ("The influx of
[American] settlers was certainly a factor in the final decision [to accept the United States'
demands in the boundary dispute]."). The presence of American settlers cannot alone account
for this territorial acquisition. See, e.g., RcH, supra note 187, at 717 ("It has been maintained,
probably with justification, that the Oregon frontier was settled by the climate of American
politics, not by the number of immigrants."). However, a long-standing view, and certainly
the one advanced by the Oregon settlers themselves, was that American possession of the
territory shaped the final settlement with the British. See Merk, Pioneers, supra note 185, at
234 ("It is a truism in American history that the success of the United States in the Oregon
boundary negotiations was due in considerable measure to the Oregon pioneers. They brought
pressure to bear on the British government during the final stages of the Oregon negotiations,
and this was a factor in winning for their country the empire of the Pacific Northwest.").
198 See CAREY, supra note 181, at 495. While a mainland border along the forty ninth
parallel was agreed to in 1846, the British and Americans continued to dispute sovereignty
over the channel islands lying between the mainland and Vancouver Island. This dispute was
not resolved until 1872, when an arbitrator ruled that several islands occupied by British mili-
tary forces should be ceded to the United States. See id. at 494-96.
199 See, e.g., GALBRArrH, HUDSON's BAY COMPANY supra note 186, at 177-91; Merk,
Pioneers, supra note 185, at 234-44; NEWMAN, CAEsARs, supra note 171, at 287. See gener-
ally CAREY, supra note 181, at 454-57 (detailing Britain's wish to maintain a border on the
Columbia River).
200 GALBRArrH, HUDSON's BAY COMPANY, supra note 186, at 226-29.
201 In 1869, the U.S. government determined that an award of $650,000 was proper for
extinguishing the private property rights of the HBC and its subsidiaries after the Treaty of
1846. See CAREY, supra note 181, at 279.
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ultimate authority. 202 In 1849, the HBC acquired a lease to all of Van-
couver Island, and in 1851, the British government appointed an HBC
officer, James Douglas, as the governor of Victoria. 20 3
The HBC had managed Vancouver Island for a little less than a
decade when a gold rush in 1858 dramatically increased British interest
in the region. In that year, 30,000 prospectors passed through British
Columbia.20 4 Governor Douglas' monopolistic control over the miners'
transportation and goods, under color of law, confirmed British suspi-
cions that Douglas was a Company man first, and for the first time, the
British government no longer considered HBC rule adequate for the ad-
ministration of the territory. 20 5 Shortly thereafter, on August 2, 1858, the
House of Commons named British Columbia a Crown colony, ending the
HBC's exclusive trading rights in the area.206 Parliament presented the
local HBC governor with the provincial governorship on the condition
that he organize a council, eventually hold elections for an assembly, and
relinquish his position in the HBC. 20 7 In place of perpetual Company
rule, Vancouver had its first democratic institutions; meanwhile, the
HBC gradually gave up its strong-armed politics for a chain of Canadian
retail stores.208
3. The British South Africa Company
After the sun finally set on HBC's empire, Cecil Rhodes introduced
its same principles of governing to southern Africa in the form of the
British South Africa Company (BSAC). 209 In its business operations, the
BSAC operated as a giant concessionaire, producing little on its own and
deriving work and profits from subcontractors. 210 In this business, the
202 See NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 309; see also RICH, supra note 187, at
787-96 (describing the Company's relationship with the British government).
203 RICH, supra note 187, at 762 (explaining that rather than the result of an alliance
between the British government and the Hudson's Bay Company, the appointment of James
Douglas was primarily an act of desperation: "Douglas' interests were, at this stage, unmistak-
ably those of the Company, of the fur trade, and of Victoria as a port and depot rather than the
broader aspects of settling the whole island. The basic fact was that no-one but the Company
would undertake the commitment.").
204 NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 308-10.
205 "The last straw," one historian writes, "was when Douglas ordered the seizure of any
ships selling non-HBC goods." Id. at 312.
206 See GALBRAITH, HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, supra note 186, at 305; NEWMAN,
CAESARS, supra note 171, at 308-12.
207 NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 312-13.
208 3 PETER C. NEWMAN, MERCHANT PRINCES 156 (Viking 1991).
209 Compare JOHN S. GALBRAITH, CROWN AND CHARTER: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE
BRrrTSH SouTH AFRICA COMPANY 106-27 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1974) [hereinafter GALBRAITH,
CROWN AND CHARTER] (describing the administration of the British South Africa Company)
with NEWMAN, CAESARS, supra note 171, at 193-315 (1987) (examining the HBC at the height
of its power).
210 See GALBRAITH, CROWN AND CHARTER, supra note 209, at 122.
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BSAC faced little regulation from the British government and had a free
hand in its dealings with African peoples. 2 11
Although the ultra vires doctrine had changed the law for joint-stock
companies, 21 2 the BSAC established its presence in southern Africa
through the same use of violence that characterized the East India and
Hudson's Bay Companies.21 3 The BSAC established the British South
Africa Police, which was, in actuality, the company's standing army.2 14
With this army at its disposal-and the revolutionary new Maxim
gun2 5-the BSAC could intervene in local tribal disputes to maintain
order and legitimize its authority, much as the Hudson's Bay Company
did in the Pacific Northwest.2 16 From time to time, the Company could
even invade neighboring territories, as it did in Mashonaland 21 7 and
Matabeland. 21 8
Initially, the British government supported the BSAC's role in man-
aging southern Africa. In Galbraith's words, this policy was "Imperial-
ism on the cheap" 21 9 because it furthered "the imperial government's
desire ... to lay claim to territories without accepting the financial bur-
dens of administration. '220 In time, however, tensions grew between the
economic interests of the Company and the political objectives of the
British Colonial Office. 22 1 Access to resources and a labor force often
dominated BSAC policy, driving it to invade new territories. 222 By con-
trast, the British government did not appreciate the BSAC's frequent use
211 See id.
212 See Greenfield, supra note 161, at 1302.
213 How the BSAC escaped the limits of the ultra vires doctrine is unknown to this author.
It may be that the British government turned a blind eye to the practices of the company to suit
its own agenda in southern Africa. See, e.g., GALBRArrIH, CROWN AND CHARTER, supra note
209, at 310. If this is the case, this willful ignorance certainly backfired on the government.
See id. at 310-39.
214 GALBRAITH, CROWN AND CHARTER, supra note 209, at 256. In 1889, this force num-
bered 480 men, in addition to the cavalry support of Ngwato allies. See id. at 143-44.
215 Id. at 147; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rv. 1443,
1477 n.142 (2009) (touching on the history and revolutionary nature of the Maxim gun).
216 See GALBRAITH, CROWN AND CHARTER, supra note 209, at 290-92 (explaining the use
of summary justice "to overawe a vastly more numerous African population"). Upon killing
twenty-one Africans in response to a trade dispute, one commander reported, "I am sure a very
wholesome lesson has been given to all the chiefs of the district." Id. at 292.
217 Id. at 128-53.
218 Id. at 287-309. The BSAC began this war because the military system of the Ndebele
in Matabeland was "incompatible with the economic objectives of the company." Id. at 287.
219 Id. at 310. This expression itself indicates that neither the practice of outsourcing nor
its problems are anything new in the western world.
220 Id. at 311.
221 See id. at 310-39.
222 See id. at 288 (discussing the Company's search for wealth in both Mashonaland and
Matabeleland).
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of force. 223 Most importantly, the Colonial Office understood that from
an African's perspective, an Englishman who served in the BSAC and an
Englishman who did not were indistinguishable. 224 Thus, any brutality
or militancy by the BSAC necessarily affected and bound the British
government. 225
As a result of these tensions, the British government finally took
control of the colony in 1923, thus eliminating the BSAC's reign that so
often conflicted with the government's interests. 226 To replace the un-
representative and unpopular administration of the British South Africa
Company, the settlers created a government of their own in Southern
Rhodesia. 227 Although the subsequent history of Rhodesia and
Zimbabwe has been far from ideal, the decline of the British South Af-
rica Company did lead to self-rule, democratic institutions, a progressive
constitution, 228 and perhaps the nation's best chance at a stable and ac-
countable government.
D. The Interstate Corporation and the American Solution
In the early twentieth century, the United States confronted domesti-
cally what the British Empire had confronted globally: large, interstate
corporations that presented a challenge to the interests of government. 229
Against this new economic reality, the old rural toryism-promoting a
return to pre-Civil War economic agrarianism as America's economic
ideal-was inadequate. 230 Just as with the relationship between the Brit-
ish Empire and its joint-stock companies, the relationship between the
national government and big business of the Progressive Era teaches a
valuable lesson in regulation: the state can only preserve the place of its
223 See, e.g., GALBRArmH, CROWN AND CHARTER, supra note 209, at 182-83 (describing
Rhodes's refusal to end aggressive action against the Portuguese, despite the Foreign Office's
acknowledgement of the Portuguese claim); id. at 292 (discussing government displeasure
with the disproportionate violence used by the BSAC against Africans); id. at 302-04 (noting
the general ineffectiveness of British officials in restraining the BSAC during the Matabele
War).
224 See id. at 303.
225 See id. In much the same way, India's Great Rebellion against the HEIC turned into a
race war in which Indian forces tried to wipe out all Europeans. See LAWSON, supra note 134,
at 161. Thus, decisions by the HEIC affected not only the British government, but Europe as a
whole.
226 See ALAN MEGAHEY, HUMPHREY GI13s: BELEAGUERED GovERNOR 19 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1998).
227 LAWRENCE VAMBE, AN ILL-FATED PEOPLE: ZIMBABWE BEFORE AND Al'rER RHODES
160-61 (Heinemann 1972).
228 See id. at 164.
229 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DiscoNTENT 211, 217 (Harv. Univ. Press
1998).
230 See id.
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democratic institutions against new concentrations of private power by
growing its own state power.
The first great chapter in the history of American corporations is the
end of the Civil War, when "[a] lively, even a frenzied, outburst of indus-
trial, commercial, and speculative activity followed hard upon the resto-
ration of peace."2 3 1 Although these changes brought the benefits of
modernization to America, they also brought its many problems.2 32
In such economic growth, there is what Herbert Croly called "an
entangling alliance between a wholesome and a baleful tendency.1 233
Out of these conditions emerged new political forces that promoted cor-
ruption and social disintegration.2 34 New characters such as the industri-
alist millionaire, the urban party "Boss," the union laborer, and the
lawyer "all [took] advantage of the loose American political organization
to promote somewhat unscrupulously their own interests, and to obtain
special sources of power and profit at the expense of a wholesome na-
tional balance. '2 35
Faced with such a situation, the United States could not rely on its
familiar Jeffersonian philosophy of asserting the freedom of its institu-
tions against the new domination of private interests. 236 By leaving each
American to his own liberty, the prevalent philosophy of individualism
and self-reliance had neglected to protect the public interest from the
forces of industrialization.2 37 Reformers such as Croly could "no longer
expect the American ship of state by virtue of its own righteous frame-
work to sail away to a safe harbor in the Promised Land. '2 38
In place of this drift, the United States needed a new political effi-
ciency that would look out for the people's interests while also respect-
ing democratic rule. 239 Applying this new philosophy, the solution was
to grow the national government so that it could properly preserve de-
mocracy-more attention to "[f]ederal responsibilities and the increase
of their number and scope, is the natural consequence of the increasing
concentration of American industrial, political, and social life."' 240 Fol-
lowing what Hobbes theorized and what Croly observed, one might con-
231 HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERIcAN LIFE 101 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1965) (1909).
232 See id. at 110-26.
233 Id. at 114-16.
234 See id. at 138.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 152-54.
237 See id. (arguing for the Hamiltonian principle of national political responsibility over
the then-prevalent Jeffersonian principle of individualism).
238 Id. at 152-53.
239 See id. at 153-44.
240 Id. at 274.
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clude that a large state presence would be necessary to defend the public
interest from more dangerous private forces. 241
The political figure who most took Croly's nationalist philosophy to
heart was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt set out his position in his
"New Nationalism" speech, which he delivered on August 31, 1910, in
Osawatomie, Kansas.242 Echoing Croly's words, Roosevelt declared,
"Our country-this great republic-means nothing unless it means the
triumph of a real democracy, the triumph of popular government .... ,243
Roosevelt identified the danger of the "sinister influence or control of
special interests" 244 to such a government. Here, Roosevelt focused on
the possibility that private corporations might interfere with the nation's
democratic institutions. 245 "The citizens of the United States," he went
on, "must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they
have themselves called into being. 246
Assuming big business was to be a permanent fixture in modern
America, 247 only the federal government could leverage the proper
amount of external control on these new interstate corporations. 248 Just
as corporations had centralized their activity, Roosevelt argued, so
should the government. 249
241 See id. (defending the growth of the federal government to match the growth of other
forces in the country); see also HOBBES, supra note 126, at 84 (explaining that without the
state's powerful representation, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short").
242 See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM 21-39 (William E. Leuchtenburg
ed., Prentice-Hall 1961) (1910) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM]; CROLY,
supra note 231, at 167-71.
243 ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM, supra note 242, at 21.
244 Id. at 27.
245 See id.
246 Id.
247 See 1 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE ROOSEVELT POLICY: SPEECHES, LETrERS AND
STATE PAPERS RELATING TO CORPORATE WEALTH AND CLOSELY ALLIED Topics 34 (The Cur-
rent Literature Pub'g Co. 1908) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT, THE ROOSEVELT POLICY]. "Under
present-day conditions," Roosevelt stated, "it is as necessary to have corporations in the busi-
ness world as it is to have organizations, unions, among wage-workers. We have a right to ask
in each case only this: that good, and not harm, shall follow." Id.
248 See id. at 232-39. Roosevelt's concerns that state governments could not preserve
their democratic institutions against large interstate corporations were not just fanciful mus-
ings. For example, in Pullman, Illinois, George Pullman operated a company town fully under
his control for nearly twenty years. Harper's Monthly described the town as "un-American
[sic] . . . benevolent, well-wishing feudalism." MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE
295-303 (Basic Books 1983) (quoting Richard Ely, Pullman: A Social Study, HARPER'S, Feb.
1885, at 452-66).
249 ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM, supra note 242, at 53 ("Big business has be-
come nationalized, and the only effective way of controlling and directing it and preventing
the abuses in connection with it is by having the people nationalize the governmental control
in order to meet the nationalization of the big business itself.").
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Roosevelt's prolific rhetoric led to the creation of new divisions
within the national government to deal with corporations. 250 In 1903, at
the behest of Roosevelt, Congress established the Department of Com-
merce and Labor, which operated the Bureau of Corporations. 251 In
Roosevelt's words, the Bureau would administer the law "with the firm
purpose not to hurt any corporation doing a legitimate business-on the
contrary to help it-and, on the other hand, not to spare any corporation
which may be guilty of illegal practices, or the methods of which may
make it a menace to the public welfare. '2 52
Following Theodore Roosevelt's administration, the ideas of New
Nationalism remained influential in national politics. From New Nation-
alism to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal253 and from the New Deal to
Johnson's Great Society,2 54 Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Croly per-
manently transformed the United States into a regulatory state. Thus,
even as business corporations have grown in size and complexity since
1903, the federal government has grown in tandem, continuing the coun-
terbalancing that Roosevelt envisioned.255
The history of the British joint-stock companies and Roosevelt's
New Nationalism leads to certain conclusions about the relationship be-
tween corporations and government. First, it points to the tensions inher-
ent in that relationship. While the state is the strongest of corporations, it
sometimes confronts strong business corporations resembling a state of
their own. This Note's brief historical overview demonstrates that this
type of confrontation is not rare. Second, the government only rises
above these business corporations by exerting a concrete power of its
own, whether that is through legislative reform from as with the British
Parliament, through judicial restraints such as the ultra vires doctrine,
or-in the case of the United States-through an expansive federal gov-
ernment. Third, the triumph of government over corporations strongly
correlates with the triumph of democratic institutions. Though almost
too obvious to point out, businesses exist to maximize wealth, and are
thus rarely accountable to the interests of anyone but their shareholders.
250 See RICHARD L. WATSON, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POWER: THE UNITED
STATES, 1900-1919 107-10 (Houghton Mifflin 1976).
251 Id.
252 ROOSEVELT, THE ROOSEVELT POLICY, supra note 247, at 113.
253 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL,
1932-1940 34 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard Brandon Morris eds., Harper & Row
1963) (asserting that the New Nationalism theorists, including Theodore Roosevelt, had the
most influence on the New Deal policy makers).
254 See THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 9-11 (Sidney M. Milkis
& Jerome M. Mileur eds., Univ. of Mass. 2005) (noting that New Deal ideas influenced Lyn-
don Johnson and Great Society policies).
255 It would be unnecessary to lay out a list of Securities Exchange Act provisions to
show that business corporations in the United States answer to the government in the end.
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While Britain's colonial governments were not perfect, they often re-
placed the rule of joint-stock trading companies with a more prudent, and
somewhat more democratic, colonial administration. 256 In the United
States, through Progressive-era movements such as New Nationalism,
the government preserved existing democratic institutions from the threat
that large corporations posed to small government. 257 Together, these
lessons are critical in understanding the next chapter in the relationship
between corporations and government: globalization.
IV. AMENDING THE FCPA TO ADDRESS THE BLACKWATER PROBLEM
A. The Challenges of Globalization
The power of private corporations that governments have wrestled
with for centuries takes on new importance in the context of globaliza-
tion. While powerful governments such as the United States have
learned to manage the world's largest corporations, globalization puts
giant interstate corporations into contact with relatively weaker states
that have little experience in dealing with the accompanying problems.
Professor Dan Danielsen explains that as a result of such contact, "we
begin to loosen our customary view that states 'act' and corporations
'react.' "258 Whenever these corporations "create or shape the content,
interpretation, efficacy, or enforcement of legal regimes, and in so doing,
produce effects on social welfare similar to the effects resulting from
rulemaking and enforcement by governments," then, Professor Danielsen
concludes, "corporate actors are engaged in governance. '"259 Andrew
Kuper points out that in the face of a new international economy, "citi-
zens of states, especially those in smaller and developing states, have
little or no control over factors that impact greatly on their lives but over
which their particular state has no authority or sway. ' 260 For these citi-
zens, a corporation "insulated from public participation, engagement, or
scrutiny" has supplanted a legitimate government. 26' It is not too much
to say that transnational corporations "have become this generation's sur-
rogate of a dominant world power. '262
Although the resulting problems are extensive and unlikely to disap-
pear any time soon, there is some hope in that the problems arising from
globalization are nothing new. As with the United States at the turn of
256 See supra part II.C.
257 See WATSON, supra note 250, at 107-10.
258 Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in
Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 413 (2005).
259 Id. at 412.
260 KUPER, supra note 39, at 125.
261 Danielsen, supra note 258, at 424.
262 Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American
Multinational Enterprise, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 89, 89 (2001).
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the twentieth century, small states around the world now confront large
multinational corporations that may have greater reach and more re-
sources than the state itself. In some cases, states cooperate with the
goals of the corporations, whatever they may be.26 3 But all too often, the
corporation pursues its goals without answering to any state. One exam-
ple of that is Blackwater's behavior in Iraq. The solution, as British and
U.S. history illustrates, is to authorize the state to grow in proportion to
the corporations it is responsible for regulating. Such growth is possible
through greater extraterritorial jurisdiction, specifically by expanding the
scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
B. The FCPA Solution
Considering the effectiveness of the FCPA, all that is presently nec-
essary to address human rights abuses by corporations such as Blackwa-
ter is political will: Congress must expand the provisions of the FCPA to
address additional crimes besides bribery and accounting fraud. As this
Note explained in Part III, the FCPA suffers from a disconnect between
the mild crimes that it addresses and the more heinous crimes that it
ignores. This disconnect is primarily a factor of history: while the
United States has so managed corporations within its borders that it need
only fear business-like crimes such as bribery or fraud, outside the
United States, business corporations may still wield all the power-par-
ticularly the monopoly on violence-of a proper state. Congress could
remedy the problem by expanding the scope of the FCPA.
In expanding the FCPA, much of the necessary language may come
from existing domestic and international legal concepts. Substantively,
Congress could seek to create criminal liability for corporations that aid
and abet or perpetrate a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity. 264 Congress could define such terms by looking to the
language of international law, particularly the Nuremberg Principles.
First, crimes against peace are the "planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international trea-
ties, agreements or assurances; or participation in a common plan or con-
spiracy for the accomplishment" of any of the same.265 Second, war
crimes are "violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but
are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or
for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
263 See, e.g., Girion, supra note 22, at Al.
264 See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 191, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1950.
265 Id., at principle IV.
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killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruc-
tion of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity. '266 Third, crimes against humanity are "murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against any
civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds, when such acts occur in execution of or in connection with any
crime against peace or any war crime." 267
While this Note has spoken to the shortcomings of international
law, this is not to say that international law cannot inform domestic law.
As the FCPA has proven, international law works best in tandem with
domestic law, serving as a medium for countries to develop effective
domestic legal regimes. 268 In addition, by codifying international law
into U.S. law, a lawmaker avoids the judicial provincialism that usually
hamstrings international law in U.S. courts.269 As a result, U.S. law
would provide these international legal principles with the teeth of a do-
mestic regime; at the same time, the United States would promote a dia-
logue between countries through international law.
Ideally, a revised FCPA would also include a special provision that
would apply exclusively to defense contractors. With the understanding
that these particular corporations intend to use force, this special provi-
sion could look to the standards for "excessive force" in the police con-
text. In excessive-force cases, courts have held individual police officers
liable for unreasonable acts of force, 270 using the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness standard to determine whether a police officer's use of
force is excessive.271 In addition to imposing liability on individual po-
lice officers, some jurisdictions have also imposed vicarious liability on
municipal corporations. 272 Using analogous reasoning, the FCPA should
allow for criminal liability for individual defense contractors who use
excessive force, and it should impose vicarious liability on the employer
corporation.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See supra Part II.
269 See discussion supra Part I.
270 See, e.g., Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no
qualified immunity from civil damages for a police officer who uses excessive force); Davis v.
City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting aside qualified immunity for police
officers who use excessive force).
271 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) ("[A]l1 claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach.").
272 See, e.g., Matczak v. Mathews, 265 Wis. 1, 60 N.W.2d 352 (1953) (allowing for claim
against city for excessive force by police officer); McCarthy v. City of Saratoga Springs, 56
N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1945) (imposing liability on city for excessive force
by police officer).
2010] THE BLACKWATER PROBLEM AND THE FCPA SOLUTION 493
To establish liability under these expanded provisions, the FCPA
should incorporate the Model Penal Code's "purpose test," that
a person acts purposely with respect to a material ele-
ment of an offense when (i) if the element involves the
nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his con-
scious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the
attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of
such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they
exist.2 7
3
Likewise, a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission
of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the com-
mission of the offense, such person aids or agrees or attempts to aid such
other person in planning or committing it.274
Jurisdiction for these provisions should follow that of the existing
FCPA. Thus, they would apply to any issuer,275 any domestic con-
cern,
27 6 or for any other person who is in the United States.277 In addi-
tion, the acts of a foreign agent or employee would create liability for a
U.S. company, and vice versa. 278
Finally, the statute must also prohibit private rights of action. 279
Such a limit would be necessary to avoid the challenges present in ATS
cases,280 and ensure that these provisions are used to promote U.S. inter-
ests abroad, rather than private interests pushed through U.S. courts.
This limit should also appeal to corporations, as it would allow them to
avoid the uncertainty present in private rights of action. 28'
CONCLUSION
During the 1970s, a series of corporate scandals led to the enact-
ment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Today, in the midst of a
273 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
274 Id. § 2.06. The Model Penal Code's purpose test is particularly attractive because the
International Criminal Court has already borrowed its language for itself. See United Nations
Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25.3(c),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 21 (1998) (establishing criminal liability by the "purpose of facili-
tating the commission of such a crime"); see also Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting
of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304, at
24-42 (2008) (noting that the ICC borrowed its language from the Model Penal Code).
275 See 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 (2006).
276 See id. § 78dd-2.
277 See id. § 78dd-3.
278 See discussion supra Part II.B.
279 See Breed, supra note 27, at 1033-34.
280 See discussion supra Part IC.
281 See Breed, supra note 27, at 1034.
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scourge of corporate abuses, the United States requires an expansion of
that Act. The Blackwater problem poignantly displays what happens
when corporations can act with impunity: such abuses hurt not only inno-
cent civilians, but also U.S. interests and its credibility as a nation. This
situation demands a real legal response, not in international law or in an
occasionally questionable foreign law, but in the criminal law of the
United States, a legal regime with the teeth to carry out justice, but also
with the constitutional protections to ensure a fair trial. For historical
reasons, U.S. law has not had to deal with corporate abuses on the scale
found in other countries, and so the FCPA currently addresses financial
crimes such as bribery while ignoring the most heinous human rights
abuses. Globalization has revealed the shortcomings of the FCPA: while
the Act has proven itself more than adequate in small matters, its success
calls for bigger things.
